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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920553-CA 
v. : 
DENNIS SESSIONS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of 
forgery, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding of guilt? 
"When challenging the findings of fact of the trial 
court on appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of 
fact were clearly erroneous." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
475 (Utah 1990). "In order to show clear error, the appellant 
must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack." Id. at 
475-76. This Court will reverse the trial court's finding of 
guilt only if it is "against the clear weight of the evidence," 
or if the Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made . . . " State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987). Where, as here, defendant has failed to 
"marshal" the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, 
this Court may properly decline to consider his argument. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1990); 
theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990); and two counts of forgery as second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utaih Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (b) & 
(3) (b) (1990) (R. 9-13) . 
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted as 
charged on the forgery counts. The remaining charges were 
dismissed due to insufficient evidence (Transcript of Bench 
Trial, 2 July 1992, [T.] at 129; R. 26). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent 
terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 34-
35). See also Second Amended Commitment to Utah State Prison, 
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filed September 16, 1993, which has not been numbered in the 
record. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Burglary and Theft 
Kathleen Cline's wallet was stolen from her Bountiful, 
Utah home on April 24, 1992 (T. 14-19, 128). Among the items in 
Mrs. Cline's wallet were $400 in cash and a checkbook containing 
fifteen to twenty blank checks (T. 19). Mrs. Cline discovered 
the theft of her wallet around noon and immediately closed her 
account at First Security Bank (FSB) in Bountiful (T. 20-21). 
Forgeries 
At 4:49 p.m. that same day, defendant cashed a check 
for $156 made out to him on Mrs. Cline's account at a Salt Lake 
City branch of FSB (T. 50; State's Exhibit #1). The memo line 
alleged the check was for "car repairs" (State's Exhibit #1). 
Dawn Arambula, the drive-up bank teller who cashed the check, 
first obtained identification from defendant and wrote his 
driver's license number on the back of the check (T. 48-50, 70; 
State's Exhibits ##1, 5). 
At 5:11 p.m., defendant cashed another check for $156 
made out to him on Mrs. Cline's account at another Salt Lake City 
branch of FSB (T. 52-57; State's Exhibit #2). As before, the 
memo line alleged the check was for "car repairs" (State's 
Exhibit #2). David Passey, the drive-up bank teller who cashed 
the second check, also obtained identification from defendant and 
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similarly wrote his driver's license number on the back of the 
check (T. 52-55, 70; State's Exhibits ##2, 5). 
Defendant attempted to cash a third check made out to 
him on Mrs. Cline's account at yet another Salt Lake City branch 
of FSB; however, the bank teller, apparently noting there was a 
"flag on the account[,] . . . confiscated" the check and 
defendant's driver's license (T. 69). 
Mrs. Cline was the sole holder/signatory of the FSB 
checking account and was not acquainted with defendant, nor had 
she authorized him or anyone else to write the checks on her 
account (T. 23). 
Police Investigation 
Officer Kilpack of the Bountiful City Police Department 
investigated the forgeries and arrested defendant and at least 
one other suspect, Edward Evans, for their alleged involvement in 
both the burglary/theft of Mrs. Cline's wallet and the subsequent 
forgeries (T. 58-66)-1 Defendant waived his right to remain 
silent2 and was interviewed by Officer Kilpack during transport 
to the Davis County Jail (T. 63-65). Defendant admitted passing 
the checks using his own identification; however, he denied any 
involvement in the burglary/theft (T. 66). Rather, defendant 
1
 Evans initially implicated defendant in the 
burglary/theft of the wallet; however, at trial, Evans claimed he 
had lied about defendant's involvement and that defendant did not 
participate in the burglary/theft (T. 85). Although Evans 
admitted stealing the wallet, he denied any involvement in the 
subsequent forgeries (T. 84). 
2
 See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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alleged that he was approached by Evans and an unidentified 
woman3 while at a 7-11 store near his home (T. 66-68) . 
According to defendant, Evans and the woman asked him to pass the 
checks because neither one of them had identification (T. 66). 
Defendant told the officer that the woman wrote out the checks 
and signed them "Kathleen Cline" (T. 116). Defendant said the 
checks were written out for $156 because "they needed 
approximately $300 to purchase cocaine and they also needed some 
gas money" (T. 68). Defendant admitted that he had a "pretty 
good idea" that the woman who signed the checks was not Kathleen 
Cline (T. 67, 117) . 
Trial Strategy 
At trial, defendant claimed he did not suspect the 
checks were stolen until after the third bank teller confiscated 
his license (T. 120). Specifically, defendant alleged that 
Evans, whom he had known since childhood, offered him a ride home 
from the 7-11 store (T. 100). Evans introduced the woman with 
him as "Kathy" and told defendant that she had just left her 
husband (T. 101). Evans then asked defendant if he would be 
willing to cash one of the woman's checks so that they could "go 
party," as neither he (Evans) nor the woman had any 
identification (T. 102). The woman explained that she had no 
identification because she had fought with her husband and had 
left with nothing but her checkbook (T. 102). 
3
 Officer Kilpack had the impression that defendant 
really knew the woman, but never specifically identified her (T. 
67) . 
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Additionally, defendant claimed that after he cashed 
the first check, the woman showed him a deposit entry in the 
check register for $1,000 and asked if he wanted to cash a 
"couple of more checks" (T. 103). Defendant said, "Sure" and 
they "drove to another bank in Sugarhouse and cashed another 
check and from there it seems [sic] like we were on a roll" (T. 
103). However, when the third bank confiscated his license, 
defendant claimed he became "very suspicious" that "[t]here was 
something a little more to it than what they had told [him]" (T. 
104). Defendant said he asked the woman about the checking 
account and that she "stuck with the same story and said she had 
broken up with her husband and that it was her checking account" 
(T. 104). Defendant told the woman to drive off, and that he 
would get his driver's license later (T. 104). 
Guilt Determination 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found 
defendant guilty of two counts of forgery. Specifically, the 
court found there was "no question" defendant knew the checks 
were stolen, "or had a good idea that they were stolen or at 
least did not belong to the person who was filling them out" (R. 
129-30, the court's oral ruling is reproduced in Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should not consider defendant's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft conviction 
because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence 
supporting the trial court's determination of guilt on the 
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charges of forgery. Even if the Court were to consider the 
merits of defendant's claim, there was ample evidence before the 
trial court to sustain its determination of defendant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF 
GUILT 
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to 
support his convictions for forgery. Br. of App. at 6-7. This 
Court should reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence based on his failure to comply with the marshaling 
requirements of State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990) 
and State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734-35 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
When challenging the findings of a trial court, it is 
the defendant's burden to marshal all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's guilt determination and then demonstrate 
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the trial court's finding 
against the asserted challenge. Moosman. 794 P.2d at 476; 
Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734. In considering a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's 
findings, the reviewing court applies a clearly erroneous 
standard. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475. Accordingly, the trial 
court's finding of guilt will be reversed only if it is "against 
the clear weight of the evidence," or if the Court "otherwise 
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reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made . . ." State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy 
burden. Rather, than marshaling all the supporting evidence and 
then demonstrating that the court's verdict is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or that the court's verdict is definitely 
and firmly mistaken, defendant has blended the evidence 
supporting the verdict with that which he believes conflicts with 
the verdict. In essence, defendant merely reargues the relative 
merits of the testimony presented below. However, this Court 
does not sit as the trier of fact, and defendant's attempt to 
reargue the evidence presented at trial is therefore not a proper 
method for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, 
[i]n order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. 
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991). Because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence 
supporting the trial court's verdict, this Court should refuse to 
consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Even if the Court were to consider defendant's 
sufficiency challenge, there was ample evidence to support 
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defendant's conviction. Rather than recount the evidence 
supporting defendant's conviction, the State refers the Court to 
the Statement of the Facts at pp. 3-6, supra. Viewed in its 
proper light on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides 
substantial support for the trial court's finding that defendant 
knowingly forged the checks on Mrs. Cline's account (R. 129-30), 
see Addendum A. This court should therefore reject defendant's 
sufficiency challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant's forgery 
convictions should be affinned. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l(o * day of November, 1993 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
HAN DECKEI 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
WILLIAM J. ALBRIGHT, attorney for appellant, 74 East 500 South, 
#245, Bountiful, Utah 84010, this IG day of November, 1993. 
'mmifcekh 
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ADDENDUM A 
checks were there, it would seem inconceivable to me, your 
Honor, that a person who was acting with that state of mind, 
who was innocent so to speak, wouldn't be aware rather early 
on that this was a crime that was being perpetrated and that 
he was part of the perpetration of that crime. 
I would submit, your Honor, that the State has 
borne its burden and that the defendant should be found 
guilty of all four counts as charged. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
The Court will rule as follows in the matter: 
First as to the facts that the Court would find, the Court 
would find that there is no question on April 24th, 1992 
someone went into Mrs. Cline's home in Bountiful and took her 
wallet that had a certain amount of cash and some blank 
checks in it. The evidence indicates that the vehicle used 
was one which belonged to a third person who is not charged, 
and the evidence shows that that vehicle was seen at the 
location in question and that there were three individuals in 
that vehicle. Mrs. Cline testified that she heard the family 
room door — or the door open only once. Mr. Evans's 
testimony is that he opened the door, saw the purse and then 
went back and told others and that Mr. Sessions, who was in 
the car, came and took the purse. Mrs. 01 sen across the 
street testified that she saw only one person go up to the 
door, that that person was a person with light blonde hair 
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1 and when she described the individual to Mrs. Cline, she 
2 indicated that she thought it would be Mr. Evans. 
3 The Court would find that the State has failed to 
4 meet its burden as to this defendant relative to the burglary 
5 or the theft. However, the Court would find that on or about 
6 the afternoon of that same day, that Mr. Evans and his female 
7 companion met the defendant, Mr. Sessions. The Court finds 
8 that at that time they requested him to cash certain checks 
9 for them. It's obvious from the checks that this is not a 
10 joint checking account such as a husband and wife would have 
11 and which would have any relevancy to any kind of a divorce. 
12 It's obvious from that. The Court further finds that there 
13 was no — that the purported owner had no idea. 
14 The evidence showed that they went to several 
15 banks. The first one they went to they wrote out a check for 
16 $156. They obtained that amount and in Mr. Sessions' own 
17 testimony they were on a roll at that point and decided to 
18 try again. They did, some 20 minutes later and a few blocks 
19 away, and again were able to cash another check in the amount 
20 of $156. The Court would find they tried a third time, but 
21 at that time the matter was flagged and Mr. Sessions — 
22 excuse me, his ID was taken. 
23 The Court would find that there is no question in 
24 the Court's mind that Mr. Sessions knew that these checks 
25 were stolen or had a good idea that they were stolen or at 
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1 least did not belong to the person who was filling them out, 
2 that he passed the checks is uncontradicted, that he obtained 
3 the money for them is also uncontradicted. The Court 
4 therefore finds that the State has met its burden as to Count 
5 2, or excuse me, Count 3 and Count 4 of forgery, which are 
6 second degree felonies. 
71 Mr. Sessions, would you please stand. The Court 
8 would inform you that you have a right to be sentenced in not 
9 less than two, no more than 30 days or you may waive that 
10 right and ask for presentence report. What is your desire in 
11 that regard? 
12 MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, I spoke with Mr. 
13 Sessions, I've spoke with him about the desirability of 
14 obtaining a presentence report and the fact that obtaining a 
15 presentence report it would aid the Court in its decision 
16 making process and that without a presentence report there is 
17 a likelihood that the defendant will be incarcerated and 
18 probably the point of incarceration would be the Point of the 
19 Mountain. Nonetheless, however, it is Mr. Sessions' desire 
20 to get it over with and to be sentenced today. 
21 THE COURT: Is that what you would like to do, 
22 Mr. Sessions? 
23 MR. SESSIONS: Yes, it is. 
24 THE COURT: Do you have a prior record, Mr. 
251 Sessions? 
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